Complete implementation of the production line incident response system (生產線異常即時反應系統) including: Backend (FastAPI): - User authentication with AD integration and session management - Chat room management (create, list, update, members, roles) - Real-time messaging via WebSocket (typing indicators, reactions) - File storage with MinIO (upload, download, image preview) Frontend (React + Vite): - Authentication flow with token management - Room list with filtering, search, and pagination - Real-time chat interface with WebSocket - File upload with drag-and-drop and image preview - Member management and room settings - Breadcrumb navigation - 53 unit tests (Vitest) Specifications: - authentication: AD auth, sessions, JWT tokens - chat-room: rooms, members, templates - realtime-messaging: WebSocket, messages, reactions - file-storage: MinIO integration, file management - frontend-core: React SPA structure 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
8.2 KiB
Authentication Capability
ADDED Requirements
Requirement: User Login with Dual-Token Session Management
The system SHALL authenticate users by forwarding credentials to the Panjit AD authentication API (https://pj-auth-api.vercel.app/api/auth/login). Upon successful AD authentication, the system SHALL generate its own internal session token (separate from the AD token), encrypt the user's password using AES-256 encryption (for auto-refresh capability), and store all session data in the database. The internal token is returned to the client for subsequent requests.
Scenario: Successful login with valid credentials
- WHEN a user submits username "ymirliu@panjit.com.tw" and password "4RFV5tgb6yhn" to
POST /api/auth/login - THEN the system SHALL forward the credentials to the AD API
- AND receive a 200 response with
tokenandusernamefields - AND encrypt the password using Fernet symmetric encryption (AES-256)
- AND generate a unique internal session token (UUID4)
- AND estimate or record the AD token expiry time (e.g., current_time + 1 hour)
- AND create a session record in the
user_sessionstable with: username, display_name (from AD), internal_token, ad_token, encrypted_password, ad_token_expires_at, refresh_attempt_count (default 0), last_activity (current time), created_at - AND return status 200 with JSON body
{"token": "<internal_token>", "display_name": "<username>"}
Scenario: Password stored securely with encryption
- WHEN a password is stored in the user_sessions table
- THEN the system SHALL encrypt it using the Fernet encryption key from environment variable FERNET_KEY
- AND the encrypted_password field SHALL contain ciphertext that differs from the plaintext
- AND decrypting the ciphertext SHALL reproduce the original password exactly
Scenario: Failed login with invalid credentials
- WHEN a user submits incorrect username or password to
POST /api/auth/login - THEN the system SHALL forward the credentials to the AD API
- AND receive a non-200 response (e.g., 401 Unauthorized)
- AND return status 401 to the client with error message
{"error": "Invalid credentials"} - AND NOT create any session record in the database
Scenario: AD API service unavailable
- WHEN a user attempts to login but the AD API (https://pj-auth-api.vercel.app) is unreachable
- THEN the system SHALL return status 503 with error message
{"error": "Authentication service unavailable"}
Requirement: User Logout
The system SHALL provide a logout endpoint that deletes the user's session record from the database.
Scenario: Successful logout with valid internal token
- WHEN an authenticated user sends
POST /api/auth/logoutwith headerAuthorization: Bearer <valid_internal_token> - THEN the system SHALL delete the session record from the
user_sessionstable - AND return status 200 with
{"message": "Logout successful"}
Scenario: Logout without authentication token
- WHEN a user sends
POST /api/auth/logoutwithout the Authorization header - THEN the system SHALL return status 401 with
{"error": "No authentication token provided"}
Requirement: Automatic AD Token Refresh with Retry Limit
The system SHALL automatically refresh the AD token before it expires (within 5 minutes of expiry) when the user makes any API request, using the encrypted password stored in the database. The system SHALL limit auto-refresh attempts to a maximum of 3 consecutive failures, after which the session is forcibly terminated (to handle cases where the AD password has been changed).
Scenario: Auto-refresh AD token on protected route access
- WHEN an authenticated user accesses a protected endpoint with a valid internal_token
- AND the stored ad_token will expire in less than 5 minutes (ad_token_expires_at - now < 5 minutes)
- AND refresh_attempt_count is less than 3
- THEN the system SHALL decrypt the encrypted_password from the database
- AND re-authenticate with the AD API using the decrypted password
- AND if authentication succeeds: update ad_token, ad_token_expires_at, reset refresh_attempt_count to 0
- AND update the last_activity timestamp
- AND allow the request to proceed normally
Scenario: No refresh needed for fresh AD token
- WHEN an authenticated user accesses a protected endpoint with a valid internal_token
- AND the stored ad_token will not expire within 5 minutes
- THEN the system SHALL NOT call the AD API
- AND update only the last_activity timestamp
- AND allow the request to proceed
Scenario: Auto-refresh fails but retry limit not reached
- WHEN an authenticated user accesses a protected endpoint triggering auto-refresh
- AND the AD API returns 401 (password invalid or changed)
- AND refresh_attempt_count is 0, 1, or 2
- THEN the system SHALL increment refresh_attempt_count by 1
- AND log the failed refresh attempt with timestamp for audit
- AND return status 401 with
{"error": "Token refresh failed. Please try again or re-login if issue persists."} - AND keep the session record in the database
Scenario: Auto-refresh fails 3 consecutive times - force logout
- WHEN an authenticated user accesses a protected endpoint
- AND refresh_attempt_count is already 2
- AND the AD API returns 401 on the 3rd refresh attempt
- THEN the system SHALL increment refresh_attempt_count to 3
- AND delete the session record from the database
- AND log the forced logout event with reason "Password may have been changed in AD"
- AND return status 401 with
{"error": "Session terminated. Your password may have been changed. Please login again."}
Scenario: Session blocked due to previous 3 failed refresh attempts
- WHEN an authenticated user accesses a protected endpoint
- AND refresh_attempt_count is already 3 (from previous failed refreshes)
- THEN the system SHALL delete the session record immediately
- AND return status 401 with
{"error": "Session expired due to authentication failures. Please login again."}
Requirement: 3-Day Inactivity Timeout
The system SHALL automatically invalidate user sessions that have been inactive for more than 3 days (72 hours). Inactivity is measured by the last_activity timestamp, which is updated on every API request.
Scenario: Reject request from inactive session
- WHEN a user accesses a protected endpoint with an internal_token
- AND the last_activity timestamp is more than 3 days (72 hours) in the past
- THEN the system SHALL delete the session record from the database
- AND return status 401 with
{"error": "Session expired due to inactivity. Please login again."}
Scenario: Active user maintains session across multiple days
- WHEN a user logs in on Day 1
- AND makes at least one API request every 2 days (Day 2, Day 4, Day 6, etc.)
- THEN the system SHALL keep the session active indefinitely
- AND update last_activity on each request
- AND auto-refresh the AD token as needed
Requirement: Token-Based Authentication for Protected Routes
The system SHALL validate internal session tokens for protected API endpoints by checking the Authorization: Bearer <internal_token> header against the user_sessions table, enforcing inactivity timeout and auto-refreshing AD tokens when necessary.
Scenario: Access protected endpoint with valid active session
- WHEN a request includes header
Authorization: Bearer <valid_internal_token> - AND the session exists in user_sessions table
- AND last_activity is within 3 days
- THEN the system SHALL update last_activity to current time
- AND check and refresh AD token if needed (per auto-refresh requirement)
- AND allow the request to proceed with user identity available
Scenario: Access protected endpoint with invalid internal token
- WHEN a request includes an internal_token that does not exist in the user_sessions table
- THEN the system SHALL return status 401 with
{"error": "Invalid or expired token"}
Scenario: Access protected endpoint without token
- WHEN a request to a protected endpoint omits the Authorization header
- THEN the system SHALL return status 401 with
{"error": "Authentication required"}