1015_IT_behavior_alignment_V2/security-fixes.md

🔒 Partner Alignment System - Security Audit Report

Audit Date: 2025-01-17
Auditor: Senior Security Architect
Project: Partner Alignment System (夥伴對齊系統)
Status: 🚨 CRITICAL ISSUES FOUND - DO NOT DEPLOY

---

📋 Basic Project Information

Project Name: Partner Alignment System (夥伴對齊系統)
Description: Employee performance assessment and feedback system with STAR methodology, ranking system, and admin dashboard

Target Users:

• System Administrators
• HR Managers
• General Employees

Types of Data Processed:

• ✅ PII (Personally Identifiable Information): Employee names, emails, employee IDs, departments, positions
• ❌ Payment/Financial Information: No
• ✅ UGC (User Generated Content): STAR feedback, assessment data

Tech Stack:

• Frontend: HTML5, Bootstrap 5, JavaScript (Vanilla), Chart.js
• Backend: Flask 2.3.3 (Python)
• Database: SQLite (development), MySQL 5.7+ (production)
• Deployment: Gunicorn + Nginx (planned)

External Dependencies:

• Flask ecosystem (Flask-SQLAlchemy, Flask-JWT-Extended, Flask-Login, Flask-Bcrypt)
• APScheduler for background tasks
• PyMySQL for MySQL connectivity

---

🚨 PART ONE: DISASTER-CLASS NOVICE MISTAKES

CRITICAL - #1: Production Database Credentials Exposed in Chat

Risk Level: 🔴 CATASTROPHIC

Threat Description: Production database credentials were shared in plain text during this conversation:

DB_HOST = mysql.theaken.com
DB_PORT = 33306
DB_NAME = db_A101
DB_USER = A101
DB_PASSWORD = Aa123456

Affected Components:

• This entire conversation log
• Any systems that logged this conversation
• Potentially AI training data if this conversation is used for training

Hacker's Playbook:

I'm just monitoring this conversation, and boom! The developer just handed me the keys to their production database. I can now:

1. Connect directly to mysql.theaken.com:33306 as user A101 with password Aa123456
2. Read all employee data, assessments, feedback, and personal information
3. Modify or delete data to cause chaos
4. Steal the entire database for identity theft or corporate espionage
5. The password Aa123456 is weak anyway - I could have brute-forced it in minutes

This is like leaving your house keys on the front door with a note saying "Welcome, I'm not home!"

Principle of the Fix:

Why can't you share credentials in chat? Because chat logs are like public bulletin boards - they can be read by AI systems, logged by your IDE, stored in conversation history, and potentially used for training. The correct approach is:

1. Use environment variables (.env file, never committed to Git)
2. Use secret management systems (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, Azure Key Vault)
3. Use different credentials for development, staging, and production
4. If you must share credentials temporarily, use encrypted channels and rotate them immediately after

Fix Recommendations:

1. IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED:

   # Connect to MySQL and change the password NOW
   mysql -h mysql.theaken.com -P 33306 -u A101 -p'Aa123456'
   ALTER USER 'A101'@'%' IDENTIFIED BY 'NEW_STRONG_PASSWORD_HERE';
   FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
   

2. Create a .env file (NEVER commit to Git):

   # Database Configuration
   DB_HOST=mysql.theaken.com
   DB_PORT=33306
   DB_NAME=db_A101
   DB_USER=A101
   DB_PASSWORD=<NEW_STRONG_PASSWORD>
   
   # Security Keys
   SECRET_KEY=<generate-random-64-char-string>
   JWT_SECRET_KEY=<generate-random-64-char-string>
   

3. Add .env to .gitignore:

   # Environment variables
   .env
   .env.local
   .env.production
   

4. Update config.py to use environment variables:

   import os
   from dotenv import load_dotenv
   
   load_dotenv()  # Load from .env file
   
   class Config:
       SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY')
       JWT_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY')
       SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = f"mysql+pymysql://{os.environ.get('DB_USER')}:{os.environ.get('DB_PASSWORD')}@{os.environ.get('DB_HOST')}:{os.environ.get('DB_PORT')}/{os.environ.get('DB_NAME')}"
   

5. Create a template file for reference:

   # Create .env.example (safe to commit)
   cp .env .env.example
   # Edit .env.example and replace all secrets with placeholders
   

---

HIGH RISK - #2: Hardcoded Secrets in Source Code

Risk Level: 🔴 HIGH

Threat Description: Multiple configuration files contain hardcoded secrets and weak default values that would be committed to version control.

Affected Components:

• config_simple.py (lines 5-6):

  SECRET_KEY = 'dev-secret-key-for-testing-only'
  JWT_SECRET_KEY = 'jwt-secret-key-for-development'
  

• simple_app.py (line 18):

  app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = 'dev-secret-key-for-testing'
  

• config.py (lines 8-9):

  SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY') or 'dev-secret-key-for-testing-only'
  JWT_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY') or 'jwt-secret-key-for-development'
  

Hacker's Playbook:

I found your GitHub repository and cloned it. In the config files, I see:

• SECRET_KEY = 'dev-secret-key-for-testing-only'
• JWT_SECRET_KEY = 'jwt-secret-key-for-development'

These are the keys used to sign JWT tokens and encrypt sessions. With these, I can:

1. Forge JWT tokens for any user
2. Impersonate any employee or admin
3. Access all API endpoints
4. Read and modify all data

It's like finding the master key to every lock in your building!

Principle of the Fix:

Why can't you hardcode secrets? Because source code is like a public library - anyone with access can read it. Secrets should be like keys in a safe - stored separately and only accessible to authorized systems. The correct approach is to use environment variables with NO fallback defaults in production code.

Fix Recommendations:

1. Remove all hardcoded secrets:

   # config.py - CORRECT
   class Config:
       SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY')  # No fallback!
       JWT_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY')  # No fallback!
   
       # Raise error if not set
       if not SECRET_KEY or not JWT_SECRET_KEY:
           raise ValueError("SECRET_KEY and JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set in environment")
   

2. Generate strong secrets:

   import secrets
   print(secrets.token_urlsafe(64))  # Use this for SECRET_KEY
   print(secrets.token_urlsafe(64))  # Use this for JWT_SECRET_KEY
   

3. Delete config_simple.py or mark it clearly as development-only:

   # config_simple.py - DEVELOPMENT ONLY
   # ⚠️ WARNING: DO NOT USE IN PRODUCTION ⚠️
   # This file contains hardcoded secrets for local development only
   # NEVER deploy this file to production servers
   

---

HIGH RISK - #3: Weak Default Passwords in Test Accounts

Risk Level: 🔴 HIGH

Threat Description: Test accounts are created with extremely weak passwords that are displayed on the login page:

• admin / admin123
• hr_manager / hr123
• user / user123

These passwords are visible in templates/index.html and simple_app.py.

Affected Components:

• templates/index.html (lines 49-59): Login page displays test credentials
• simple_app.py (lines 276-301): Test account creation with weak passwords
• create_test_accounts.py: Test account creation script

Hacker's Playbook:

I visit your login page and see a nice card showing test account credentials:

• Admin: admin / admin123
• HR Manager: hr_manager / hr123
• User: user / user123

These are like leaving your house with the door unlocked and a sign saying "Come on in!" I can now:

1. Log in as admin and access all system functions
2. Create, modify, or delete any data
3. Access sensitive employee information
4. If these accounts exist in production, I have full system access

Principle of the Fix:

Why can't you show passwords on the login page? Because the login page is public - anyone can see it. It's like putting your ATM PIN on your credit card. Test accounts should either:

1. Only exist in development environments
2. Be disabled in production
3. Use randomly generated passwords that are NOT displayed
4. Require immediate password change on first login

Fix Recommendations:

1. Remove test account display from production:

   <!-- templates/index.html -->
   <!-- Only show test accounts in development -->
   {% if config.DEBUG %}
   <div class="card mt-3">
       <div class="card-header bg-warning">
           <h6 class="mb-0">⚠️ Development Mode - Test Accounts</h6>
       </div>
       <!-- Test account info here -->
   </div>
   {% endif %}
   

2. Use environment-based test account creation:

   # simple_app.py
   def create_test_accounts():
       # Only create test accounts in development
       if not app.config.get('DEBUG', False):
           print("⚠️ Skipping test account creation in production")
           return
   
       # Use stronger test passwords
       test_accounts = [
           {
               'username': 'admin',
               'password_hash': generate_password_hash('TestAdmin2024!'),
               # ...
           }
       ]
   

3. Force password change on first login:

   # Add to User model
   class User(db.Model):
       # ...
       password_changed_at = db.Column(db.DateTime)
       must_change_password = db.Column(db.Boolean, default=True)
   

---

HIGH RISK - #4: SQLite Database File in Repository

Risk Level: 🔴 HIGH

Threat Description: The SQLite database file instance/partner_alignment.db appears to be in the project directory and could be committed to version control, exposing all development data.

Affected Components:

• instance/partner_alignment.db - Contains user data, assessments, feedback

Hacker's Playbook:

I clone your repository and find instance/partner_alignment.db. I open it with any SQLite browser and see:

• All user accounts with password hashes
• All assessment data
• All STAR feedback
• Employee personal information

Even if passwords are hashed, I can still:

1. Extract all PII for identity theft
2. Analyze your business data for competitive intelligence
3. Use the data to craft targeted phishing attacks
4. If password hashes are weak, potentially crack them

Principle of the Fix:

Why can't you commit database files? Because databases contain real data - even in development. It's like committing a photo album of your family with names and addresses. Database files should be:

1. Listed in .gitignore
2. Never committed to version control
3. Recreated from migrations or seed data
4. Treated as sensitive as source code

Fix Recommendations:

1. Add to .gitignore:

   # Database files
   *.db
   *.sqlite
   *.sqlite3
   instance/
   *.db-journal
   *.db-wal
   *.db-shm
   

2. Remove from Git if already committed:

   git rm --cached instance/partner_alignment.db
   git commit -m "Remove database file from version control"
   

3. Create database initialization script:

   # init_db.py
   from app import app, db
   from models import *
   
   with app.app_context():
       db.drop_all()
       db.create_all()
       print("Database initialized successfully")
   

---

MEDIUM RISK - #5: No HTTPS/TLS Configuration

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

Threat Description: The application runs on HTTP without TLS/SSL encryption, exposing all data in transit to interception.

Affected Components:

• simple_app.py (line 373): app.run(debug=True, host='0.0.0.0', port=5000)
• No SSL/TLS configuration
• No certificate setup

Hacker's Playbook:

I'm on the same network as your users (coffee shop WiFi, office network). I use a packet sniffer to intercept all traffic. I can see:

• Usernames and passwords in plain text
• JWT tokens being transmitted
• All API requests and responses
• Employee data being sent to the server

It's like having a conversation in a crowded room where everyone can hear you!

Principle of the Fix:

Why do you need HTTPS? Because HTTP is like sending postcards - anyone who handles them can read the message. HTTPS is like sending sealed letters - only the recipient can read them. Even in development, you should use HTTPS to catch issues early.

Fix Recommendations:

1. For Development - Use Flask with SSL:

   # simple_app.py
   if __name__ == '__main__':
       context = ('cert.pem', 'key.pem')  # Self-signed cert for dev
       app.run(debug=True, host='0.0.0.0', port=5000, ssl_context=context)
   

2. For Production - Use Nginx as reverse proxy:

   # nginx.conf
   server {
       listen 443 ssl http2;
       server_name your-domain.com;
   
       ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem;
       ssl_certificate_key /path/to/key.pem;
   
       location / {
           proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:5000;
           proxy_set_header Host $host;
           proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
           proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
           proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
       }
   }
   

3. Force HTTPS in Flask:

   # app.py
   from flask_talisman import Talisman
   
   Talisman(app, force_https=True)
   

---

🔍 PART TWO: STANDARD APPLICATION SECURITY AUDIT

A01: Broken Access Control

Risk Level: 🔴 HIGH

Issues Found:

1. No JWT Verification on Many Endpoints:

   • simple_app.py endpoints lack @jwt_required() decorator
   • Anyone can access API endpoints without authentication

2. No Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):

   • Admin endpoints are accessible to all authenticated users
   • No permission checking on sensitive operations

Fix Recommendations:

# Add JWT protection to all endpoints
from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, get_jwt_identity

@app.route('/api/admin/users', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_role('admin')  # Custom decorator
def get_admin_users():
    # Implementation
    pass

# Create custom decorator
from functools import wraps
from flask import jsonify

def require_role(role_name):
    def decorator(f):
        @wraps(f)
        @jwt_required()
        def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
            current_user = get_jwt_identity()
            user = User.query.filter_by(username=current_user).first()
            
            if not user or role_name not in [r.name for r in user.roles]:
                return jsonify({'error': 'Insufficient permissions'}), 403
            
            return f(*args, **kwargs)
        return decorated_function
    return decorator

---

A02: Cryptographic Failures

Risk Level: 🔴 HIGH

Issues Found:

1. Passwords Stored in Plain Text:

   • simple_app.py (line 283): 'password_hash': 'admin123'
   • Passwords are NOT hashed before storage

2. Weak Password Hashing:

   • No password complexity requirements
   • No password strength validation

Fix Recommendations:

# Use Flask-Bcrypt for password hashing
from flask_bcrypt import Bcrypt

bcrypt = Bcrypt(app)

class User(db.Model):
    # ...
    password_hash = db.Column(db.String(255), nullable=False)
    
    def set_password(self, password):
        """Hash and set password"""
        self.password_hash = bcrypt.generate_password_hash(password).decode('utf-8')
    
    def check_password(self, password):
        """Verify password"""
        return bcrypt.check_password_hash(self.password_hash, password)

# In simple_app.py
test_accounts = [
    {
        'username': 'admin',
        'password': 'Admin@2024!Strong',  # Strong password
        # Don't store password_hash directly
    }
]

for account in test_accounts:
    user = User(username=account['username'], ...)
    user.set_password(account['password'])  # Hash it!
    db.session.add(user)

---

A03: Injection Attacks

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

Issues Found:

1. SQL Injection Risk in Position Filter:

   • simple_app.py (line 349): query.filter(EmployeePoint.position.like(f'%{position}%'))
   • User input is directly used in SQL query

2. No Input Validation:

   • No validation on user inputs
   • No sanitization of user data

Fix Recommendations:

# Use parameterized queries (SQLAlchemy does this automatically, but be careful)
# Instead of:
query.filter(EmployeePoint.position.like(f'%{position}%'))

# Do:
query.filter(EmployeePoint.position.like(f'%{position}%'))  # SQLAlchemy handles this safely

# Add input validation
from marshmallow import Schema, fields, validate

class PositionFilterSchema(Schema):
    position = fields.Str(validate=validate.Length(max=100))
    department = fields.Str(validate=validate.OneOf(['IT', 'HR', 'Finance', 'Marketing', 'Sales', 'Operations']))
    min_points = fields.Int(validate=validate.Range(min=0, max=10000))
    max_points = fields.Int(validate=validate.Range(min=0, max=10000))

@app.route('/api/rankings/advanced', methods=['GET'])
def get_advanced_rankings():
    schema = PositionFilterSchema()
    errors = schema.validate(request.args)
    if errors:
        return jsonify({'errors': errors}), 400
    
    # Safe to use validated data
    position = request.args.get('position')
    # ...

---

A05: Security Misconfiguration

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

Issues Found:

1. Debug Mode Enabled in Production:

   • simple_app.py (line 373): app.run(debug=True, ...)
   • Debug mode exposes stack traces and debugging information

2. CORS Too Permissive:

   • simple_app.py (line 24): CORS(app, origins=['http://localhost:5000', ...])
   • Should restrict to specific domains in production

3. No Security Headers:

   • Missing security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, etc.)

Fix Recommendations:

# Disable debug in production
import os

DEBUG = os.environ.get('FLASK_DEBUG', 'False').lower() == 'true'
app.run(debug=DEBUG, host='0.0.0.0', port=5000)

# Configure CORS properly
CORS(app, origins=os.environ.get('ALLOWED_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:5000').split(','))

# Add security headers
from flask_talisman import Talisman

Talisman(app,
    force_https=True,
    strict_transport_security=True,
    strict_transport_security_max_age=31536000,
    content_security_policy={
        'default-src': "'self'",
        'style-src': "'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
        'script-src': "'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
    }
)

---

A06: Vulnerable and Outdated Components

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

Issues Found:

1. Outdated Dependencies:

   • Flask 2.3.3 (latest is 3.0.x)
   • Flask-Login 0.6.2/0.6.3 (latest is 0.6.3)
   • Werkzeug 2.3.7 (latest is 3.0.x)

2. No Dependency Scanning:

   • No automated vulnerability scanning
   • No CVE tracking

Fix Recommendations:

# Update dependencies
pip install --upgrade Flask Flask-SQLAlchemy Flask-CORS Flask-Login Flask-JWT-Extended Flask-Bcrypt

# Use safety to check for vulnerabilities
pip install safety
safety check

# Or use pip-audit
pip install pip-audit
pip-audit

# Add to CI/CD pipeline
# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  security:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v2
      - name: Run safety check
        run: |
          pip install safety
          safety check
      - name: Run pip-audit
        run: |
          pip install pip-audit
          pip-audit

---

A07: Identification and Authentication Failures

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

Issues Found:

1. No Rate Limiting:

   • Login endpoint has no rate limiting
   • Vulnerable to brute force attacks

2. No Account Lockout:

   • Failed login attempts are not tracked
   • No account lockout after multiple failures

3. Weak Session Management:

   • No session timeout configuration
   • JWT tokens don't have proper expiration

Fix Recommendations:

# Add rate limiting
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address

limiter = Limiter(
    app=app,
    key_func=get_remote_address,
    default_limits=["200 per day", "50 per hour"]
)

@app.route('/api/auth/login', methods=['POST'])
@limiter.limit("5 per minute")  # 5 login attempts per minute
def login():
    # Implementation
    pass

# Add account lockout
class User(db.Model):
    # ...
    failed_login_attempts = db.Column(db.Integer, default=0)
    locked_until = db.Column(db.DateTime, nullable=True)

@app.route('/api/auth/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
    user = User.query.filter_by(username=username).first()
    
    # Check if account is locked
    if user.locked_until and user.locked_until > datetime.utcnow():
        return jsonify({'error': 'Account is locked. Try again later.'}), 423
    
    # Verify password
    if not user.check_password(password):
        user.failed_login_attempts += 1
        
        # Lock account after 5 failed attempts
        if user.failed_login_attempts >= 5:
            user.locked_until = datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=15)
        
        db.session.commit()
        return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid credentials'}), 401
    
    # Reset failed attempts on successful login
    user.failed_login_attempts = 0
    db.session.commit()
    # ...

---

A09: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

Issues Found:

1. No Security Event Logging:

   • No logging of failed login attempts
   • No logging of privilege escalations
   • No logging of sensitive operations

2. No Monitoring:

   • No alerting for suspicious activities
   • No audit trail

Fix Recommendations:

# Add comprehensive logging
import logging
from datetime import datetime

# Configure logging
logging.basicConfig(
    level=logging.INFO,
    format='%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s',
    handlers=[
        logging.FileHandler('security.log'),
        logging.StreamHandler()
    ]
)

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

@app.route('/api/auth/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
    # Log login attempts
    logger.info(f"Login attempt from IP: {request.remote_addr}, Username: {username}")
    
    if not user.check_password(password):
        logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt from IP: {request.remote_addr}, Username: {username}")
        # ...
    
    logger.info(f"Successful login from IP: {request.remote_addr}, Username: {username}")

# Add audit logging for sensitive operations
def audit_log(action, user_id, details):
    """Log security-relevant actions"""
    logger.info(f"AUDIT - Action: {action}, User: {user_id}, Details: {details}, IP: {request.remote_addr}")

@app.route('/api/admin/users/<int:user_id>', methods=['PUT'])
@jwt_required()
@require_role('admin')
def update_user(user_id):
    # Log the action
    audit_log('USER_UPDATE', get_jwt_identity(), f'Updated user {user_id}')
    # ...

---

🔧 PART THREE: DEPLOYMENT SECURITY

File Permissions

Recommendations:

# Sensitive files should have restricted permissions
chmod 600 .env
chmod 600 instance/partner_alignment.db
chmod 700 instance/

# Web server files
chmod 755 static/
chmod 644 static/css/*
chmod 644 static/js/*
chmod 644 templates/*

# Python files
chmod 644 *.py
chmod 755 run.bat

Web Server Configuration

Nginx Configuration:

# Block access to sensitive files
location ~ /\. {
    deny all;
    access_log off;
    log_not_found off;
}

location ~ \.(env|git|sql|bak)$ {
    deny all;
    access_log off;
    log_not_found off;
}

location ~ /instance/ {
    deny all;
    access_log off;
    log_not_found off;
}

# Security headers
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "no-referrer-when-downgrade" always;

---

📊 SECURITY SCORE SUMMARY

Category	Score	Status
Secrets Management	0/10	🔴 CRITICAL
Authentication	3/10	🔴 HIGH RISK
Authorization	2/10	🔴 HIGH RISK
Data Protection	4/10	🟡 MEDIUM RISK
Infrastructure	3/10	🟡 MEDIUM RISK
Monitoring	2/10	🟡 MEDIUM RISK
OVERALL	14/60	🔴 DO NOT DEPLOY

---

🎯 PRIORITY ACTION ITEMS

IMMEDIATE (Do Before Anything Else):

1. ✅ Change production database password
2. ✅ Remove credentials from this conversation
3. ✅ Set up proper .env file management
4. ✅ Add .env and database files to .gitignore

HIGH PRIORITY (Before Deployment):

1. Implement proper password hashing
2. Add JWT authentication to all endpoints
3. Implement role-based access control
4. Remove test account display from production
5. Configure HTTPS/TLS
6. Add security headers
7. Implement rate limiting
8. Add comprehensive logging

MEDIUM PRIORITY (Before Production):

1. Update all dependencies
2. Add input validation
3. Implement account lockout
4. Set up monitoring and alerting
5. Configure proper file permissions
6. Set up automated security scanning

---

📝 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

DO NOT DEPLOY THIS APPLICATION TO PRODUCTION until all critical and high-priority issues are resolved.

The application has fundamental security flaws that would make it vulnerable to:

• Complete database compromise
• User impersonation
• Data theft
• System takeover
• Regulatory compliance violations (GDPR, etc.)

Recommended Next Steps:

1. Fix all critical issues immediately
2. Conduct a second security audit after fixes
3. Implement a security-first development process
4. Set up automated security testing in CI/CD
5. Train team on secure coding practices
6. Establish incident response procedures

---

Report Generated: 2025-01-17
Auditor: Senior Security Architect
Next Review: After critical fixes are implemented