feat: implement 5 QA-driven security and quality proposals

Implemented proposals from comprehensive QA review:

1. extend-csrf-protection
   - Add POST to CSRF protected methods in frontend
   - Global CSRF middleware for all state-changing operations
   - Update tests with CSRF token fixtures

2. tighten-cors-websocket-security
   - Replace wildcard CORS with explicit method/header lists
   - Disable query parameter auth in production (code 4002)
   - Add per-user WebSocket connection limit (max 5, code 4005)

3. shorten-jwt-expiry
   - Reduce JWT expiry from 7 days to 60 minutes
   - Add refresh token support with 7-day expiry
   - Implement token rotation on refresh
   - Frontend auto-refresh when token near expiry (<5 min)

4. fix-frontend-quality
   - Add React.lazy() code splitting for all pages
   - Fix useCallback dependency arrays (Dashboard, Comments)
   - Add localStorage data validation in AuthContext
   - Complete i18n for AttachmentUpload component

5. enhance-backend-validation
   - Add SecurityAuditMiddleware for access denied logging
   - Add ErrorSanitizerMiddleware for production error messages
   - Protect /health/detailed with admin authentication
   - Add input length validation (comment 5000, desc 10000)

All 521 backend tests passing. Frontend builds successfully.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
beabigegg
2026-01-12 23:19:05 +08:00
parent df50d5e7f8
commit 35c90fe76b
48 changed files with 2132 additions and 403 deletions

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
# JWT - Must be set in environment, no default allowed
JWT_SECRET_KEY: str = ""
JWT_ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
JWT_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 10080 # 7 days
JWT_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 # 1 hour (short-lived access token)
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS: int = 7 # Refresh token valid for 7 days
@field_validator("JWT_SECRET_KEY")
@classmethod
@@ -127,6 +128,12 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
QUERY_LOGGING: bool = False # Enable SQLAlchemy query logging
QUERY_COUNT_THRESHOLD: int = 10 # Warn when query count exceeds this threshold
# Environment
ENVIRONMENT: str = "development" # Options: development, staging, production
# WebSocket Settings
MAX_WEBSOCKET_CONNECTIONS_PER_USER: int = 5 # Maximum concurrent WebSocket connections per user
class Config:
env_file = ".env"
case_sensitive = True

View File

@@ -356,3 +356,140 @@ def create_token_payload(
"department_id": department_id,
"is_system_admin": is_system_admin,
}
# Refresh Token Functions
REFRESH_TOKEN_BYTES = 32
def generate_refresh_token() -> str:
"""
Generate a cryptographically secure refresh token.
Returns:
A URL-safe base64-encoded random token
"""
return secrets.token_urlsafe(REFRESH_TOKEN_BYTES)
def get_refresh_token_key(user_id: str, token: str) -> str:
"""
Generate the Redis key for a refresh token.
Args:
user_id: The user's ID
token: The refresh token
Returns:
Redis key string
"""
# Hash the token to avoid storing it directly as a key
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
return f"refresh_token:{user_id}:{token_hash}"
def store_refresh_token(redis_client, user_id: str, token: str) -> None:
"""
Store a refresh token in Redis with user binding.
Args:
redis_client: Redis client instance
user_id: The user's ID
token: The refresh token to store
"""
key = get_refresh_token_key(user_id, token)
# Store with TTL based on REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS
ttl_seconds = settings.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60
redis_client.setex(key, ttl_seconds, user_id)
def validate_refresh_token(redis_client, user_id: str, token: str) -> bool:
"""
Validate a refresh token exists in Redis and is bound to the user.
Args:
redis_client: Redis client instance
user_id: The expected user ID
token: The refresh token to validate
Returns:
True if token is valid, False otherwise
"""
key = get_refresh_token_key(user_id, token)
stored_user_id = redis_client.get(key)
if stored_user_id is None:
return False
# Handle Redis bytes type
if isinstance(stored_user_id, bytes):
stored_user_id = stored_user_id.decode("utf-8")
return stored_user_id == user_id
def invalidate_refresh_token(redis_client, user_id: str, token: str) -> bool:
"""
Invalidate (delete) a refresh token from Redis.
Args:
redis_client: Redis client instance
user_id: The user's ID
token: The refresh token to invalidate
Returns:
True if token was deleted, False if it didn't exist
"""
key = get_refresh_token_key(user_id, token)
result = redis_client.delete(key)
return result > 0 if isinstance(result, int) else bool(result)
def invalidate_all_user_refresh_tokens(redis_client, user_id: str) -> int:
"""
Invalidate all refresh tokens for a user.
Args:
redis_client: Redis client instance
user_id: The user's ID
Returns:
Number of tokens invalidated
"""
pattern = f"refresh_token:{user_id}:*"
count = 0
for key in redis_client.scan_iter(match=pattern):
redis_client.delete(key)
count += 1
return count
def decode_refresh_token_user_id(token: str, redis_client) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Find the user ID associated with a refresh token by searching Redis.
This is used when we only have the token and need to find which user it belongs to.
Note: This is less efficient but necessary for refresh token validation when
the user_id is not provided in the request.
Args:
token: The refresh token
redis_client: Redis client instance
Returns:
User ID if found, None otherwise
"""
# We need to search for the token across all users
# This is done by checking the token hash pattern
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
pattern = f"refresh_token:*:{token_hash}"
for key in redis_client.scan_iter(match=pattern):
# Extract user_id from key format: refresh_token:{user_id}:{token_hash}
if isinstance(key, bytes):
key = key.decode("utf-8")
parts = key.split(":")
if len(parts) == 3:
return parts[1]
return None